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One Murder, Two Trials: Can the Final Stasi Judgment Halt the Sempio Proceedings?

4 days ago
10 min read

Updated: 3 days ago

The Garlasco case: the independence of criminal proceedings, the reopening of a final conviction and the constitutional limits on staying a trial.


Alberto Stasi has been convicted of the murder of Chiara Poggi. The Pavia Prosecutor's Office has now requested that Andrea Sempio be sent for trial. If the new prosecution leads to a finding incompatible with the previous one, which ruling prevails? And above all: can the second trial begin before the first is reviewed?


Illustration of two case files in front of a courthouse

The question, before the answers

On 3 November 2026, the Pavia Public Prosecutor's Office asked the preliminary hearing judge to commit Andrea Sempio for trial in relation to the murder of Chiara Poggi on 13 August 2007. Alberto Stasi has already been convicted of that crime by a final judgment. At the time of writing, the judge has not yet ruled on the request, and Stasi's defence has announced, but not yet lodged, an application to reopen the conviction.


Sempio's defence has argued that the proceedings should await the outcome of the proposed reopening and has raised the possibility of a constitutional challenge. That question deserves attention, but an essential distinction must be made: two competing prosecution narratives are not yet two conflicting final judgments. Today there is one final conviction and one new prosecution, not two irreconcilable final judgments.


A final judgment protects an individual; it does not monopolise historical truth

A final criminal judgment is not simply a judicial opinion. It produces lasting legal effects: it establishes responsibility for the convicted person and establishes the basis for the execution of the sentence, subject to the extraordinary remedies provided by law. However, this does not mean that every fact established by that judgment becomes binding for all other judges, in every different proceeding.


The principle of ne bis in idem, enshrined in Article 649 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, prevents the same person from being tried again for the same historical event after a final decision. It is an individual guarantee, not a prohibition on prosecuting anyone else in relation to the same event. Therefore, even if there is only one murder, the Stasi judgment does not, in itself, render the prosecution against Sempio inadmissible.


A misunderstanding must also be avoided: the absence, in the indictment filed today against Sempio, of a charge of complicity with Stasi does not, in itself, prove that the future trial must necessarily establish the existence of a single perpetrator. The complicity of persons in a crime is legally possible even in homicide; what matters, for the purposes of any potential dispute, is the essential facts actually established, not just the way the indictment is worded.


A final criminal judgment may be admitted as evidence in another trial. It cannot decide that case for the second judge.

Article 238-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows final criminal judgments to be used as evidence of the facts established therein, but requires a critical evaluation of them, pursuant to Articles 187 and 192, paragraph 3, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Simply put, the judge in the new trial can review and use the previous judgment, without being bound by it as if he had already issued that decision himself.


The Constitutional Court has deemed this provision compatible with due process: adversarial proceedings on the external judgment are exercised primarily during the phase in which its content is discussed and evaluated. The Court of Cassation has also recently reaffirmed that the same historical fact can be the subject of a new investigation against different defendants.


This autonomy does not allow evidentiary shortcuts. The statements and findings from the Stasi trial do not automatically become usable against Sempio because they are cited in the ruling's reasoning: the acquisition of individual documents remains subject to its own rules. A final ruling is a piece of evidence to be evaluated, not legal proof of the guilt of the other defendant.


Outline: Stasi judgment and Sempio proceedings are distinct paths

When an actual conflict between final judgments may arise

Let's imagine two future outcomes. In the first, the new sentence establishes facts consistent with multiple people participating in the murder: the coexistence of the two convictions would not, for that reason alone, be contradictory. In the second, a judge finds that Sempio was the sole perpetrator and that Stasi did not participate in the crime, while Stasi's final conviction is based on the opposite reconstruction. Here, the conflict might concern not moral evaluation or legal qualification, but the historical identity of the perpetrator of the murder.


The Code specifically addresses the possibility of factual incompatibility between final judgments. Article 630, paragraph 1, letter a), of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows for a conviction to be reviewed when the facts on which it is based cannot be reconciled with those established in another final criminal judgment. This is known as a theoretical conflict between final judgments. However, it is not enough for two judges to have reasoned differently: the incompatibility must concern decisive historical facts. And, according to Article 631 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the evidence underlying the review must be sufficient, if verified, to demonstrate that the convicted person should be acquitted.


Paradoxically, the very existence of this remedy argues against the absolute ban on retrials: if the legal system regulates the possibility of a review in the presence of two irreconcilable final judgments, it allows for such a situation to arise. The question remains whether it is constitutionally necessary to prevent it first by suspending the subsequent proceedings.


The Constitution: four principles pointing in different directions

Sempio's defence could invoke Articles 3, 24, and 111 of the Constitution: reasonableness, inviolability of the right to defence, and due process. But it's also necessary to consider Article 112, which establishes the mandatory nature of criminal prosecution. These four parameters, therefore, do not provide a clear answer.


Article 3 — Reasonableness. Is it reasonable for the State to uphold a conviction while constructing a new one, based on a potentially irreconcilable reconstruction? The question is legitimate, but the Constitution does not guarantee in theory that decisions adopted in different trials will be identical.


Article 24 — defence. The real issue is not whether Sempio must contend with a previous ruling, but whether this fact concretely prevents him from challenging evidence, proposing investigations, or exercising other procedural rights. If these safeguards remain intact, the violation of the right to defence cannot be presumed.


Article 111 — Fair trial. The autonomy of investigations must coexist with adversarial proceedings and a reasonable duration. A suspension of uncertain duration, linked to a review initiated by another body, may in turn affect the guarantee of a reasonable timeframe for adjudication.


Article 112 — Mandatory nature of criminal prosecution. This principle does not prohibit any suspension provided by law, but it raises questions about a rule that indefinitely prevents the prosecution of a new defendant until the first defendant initiates or wins the case.


The constitutional precedent that cannot be ignored

The Code of Criminal Procedure is generally based on the self-sufficiency of criminal jurisdiction: pursuant to Article 2, the judge resolves the issues on which his or her decision depends. The suspensions for preliminary questions provided for in Articles 3 and 479 concern, under certain conditions, civil or administrative disputes. There is no general ground for suspension pending the resolution of a different criminal proceeding.


The Constitutional Court had already examined the absence of such a power to stay proceedings in 1996, finding the question then raised to be manifestly unfounded. In 2013 the Court of Cassation likewise held that the legislature's decision not to establish a general rule of suspension pending a related criminal case was not unreasonable, including under Articles 3 and 111 of the Constitution.


Precedents don't automatically decide the Garlasco case: in that context, the same combination of a final judgment, a new murder charge, and the proposed extraordinary review didn't exist. However, they do point to a clear systematic trend: the mere connection between two trials doesn't generate a right to a stay.


Can the issue be brought before the Constitutional Court?

Yes, but not through a direct application by the defence. At the preliminary hearing, Sempio's counsel may ask the judge to refer a constitutional question. The judge must identify the statutory provision challenged and establish both that the question is relevant to the decision and that it is not manifestly unfounded.


A more technically defined formulation would not call for declaring the "Sempio trial unconstitutional," but would censure Article 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the suspension system, in that part which does not allow for a reasoned suspension when a permitted review is already pending and the determination of the two proceedings presents a specific factual incompatibility and concrete prejudice to the rights of the defence.


This approach also faces two difficulties. The first is demonstrating why the outcome of the Stasi review is truly prejudicial to the decision on Sempio: an acquittal of Stasi would not prove Sempio's guilt, and an upholding of the conviction would not automatically prove Sempio's innocence. The second is asking the Constitutional Court to choose among several possible remedies—mandatory or optional suspension, before or after the review is admitted, and for what duration—without any constitutionally necessary one emerging.


The situation is even more delicate if, as at the time of this article, the review is merely announced. The continuation of the preliminary hearing cannot be made indefinitely dependent on an appeal that a different party might not even file or that might be declared inadmissible.


An essential distinction: the preliminary hearing is not already the judgment of guilt

The preliminary hearing judge must decide whether the accusation has the necessary substance to stand trial. Article 425, paragraph 3, of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CPP) mandates dismissal when the evidence gathered does not allow a reasonable expectation of a conviction. It is in this context that the tension between the reconstructions of the murder can become immediately significant: not as an abstract prohibition on prosecuting Sempio, but as part of the examination of the strength and coherence of the evidence presented to support the charge.


On the other hand, a Stasi review can also be proposed based on new evidence pursuant to Article 630, paragraph 1, letter c), without having to wait for a second final conviction. The reason under letter a), based on the conflict between final judgments, requires the existence of another res judicata. This is a crucial temporal and legal difference.


Conclusion: the problem is real, but a stay is not automatic

The risk of arriving at two rulings based on irreconcilable historical facts is not a rhetorical device. It questions the legal system's ability to correct its own errors and simultaneously protect the stability of decisions, the freedom of evidentiary ascertainment, and the right to defence.


However, the risk of conflict does not automatically prohibit a second trial. The Stasi res judicata is binding within the limits of an irrevocable decision; it does not render the charge against Sempio inadmissible. The review is a means of correcting a conviction, not a general condition for admissibility of the case against a different defendant.


The constitutional question becomes serious only if it moves from denouncing a paradox to demonstrating a concrete prejudice, which cannot be resolved through the guarantees already provided by the code. In the absence of this demonstration, the autonomy of the two assessments currently appears to be the most consistent solution within the system. Criminal law can tolerate the risk of two incompatible reconstructions; it cannot tolerate a conviction—nor its possible review—substituting proof of personal responsibility in the trial of another person.


Editorial note

This analysis is based on public information available as at 7 November 2026. It makes no finding concerning Andrea Sempio's responsibility or the correctness of Alberto Stasi's final conviction.



Notes and references

1. Public Prosecutor's Office at the Court of Pavia, press release dated November 3, 2026, with the indictment; ANSA, November 3, 2026, regarding the request for indictment and the announced review. The indictment has been requested by the Public Prosecutor and has not yet been ordered by the Preliminary Hearing Judge. Information status: November 7, 2026.


2. Art. 649 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Court, judgment no. 200 of 2016 (ECLI:IT:COST:2016:200): for the purposes of ne bis in idem, the identity of the fact is historical-naturalistic; it remains necessary that the new proceedings concern the person already tried. The guarantee applies to the subjective bis in idem principle, not to any judgment concerning the same event.


3. Constitutional Court, judgment no. 29 of 2009 (ECLI:IT:COST:2009:29), on art. 238-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure: an irrevocable decision issued in another proceeding is assessable according to the legal regime; adversarial proceedings are carried out through its evaluation and application, without its automatic binding force.


4. Supreme Court of Cassation, Criminal Section II, May 13, 2026, no. 17275; cf. Supreme Court of Cassation, Criminal Section V, December 6, 2017, filing 2018, no. 633. The 2026 ruling primarily concerned a different legal classification (extortion/private violence) and should not be treated as a precedent identical to a future historical irreconcilability regarding the exclusive perpetrator of a murder.


5. Article 238 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the acquisition of minutes of evidence from other proceedings; Article 238-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure for final judgments. The Supreme Court of Cassation, Criminal Section II, no. 17275 of 2026, emphasizes the difference between a judgment as evidence of historical fact and the statements contained therein, which are subject to their own rules of use.


6. Articles 630, paragraph 1, letter a), and 631 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Court, judgment no. 129 of 2008 (ECLI:IT:COST:2008:129), regarding the "theoretical" conflict based on facts and not mere assessments; Constitutional Court, judgment no. 42 of 2018 (ECLI:IT:COST:2018:42), which requires the specific identification of mutually irreconcilable facts. Not every difference between rulings constitutes grounds for review.


7. Constitutional Court, Order No. 159 of 1996 (ECLI:IT:COST:1996:159): the question regarding Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in a juvenile case connected to another, more advanced proceeding, is manifestly unfounded; the connection does not constitute a necessary preliminary ruling. The constitutional articles examined were Articles 3, 76, 77, and 97.


8. Supreme Court of Cassation, Criminal Section, VI, June 18, 2013, no. 44261, regarding slander and the statute of limitations: the system does not provide for a general suspension of criminal proceedings due to the pending nature of a logically related criminal proceeding; the legislator's choice was deemed not unreasonable with respect to Articles 3 and 111 of the Constitution. The specific case is different, but the systematic problem of criminal prejudiciality is identical.


9. Article 23, Law No. 87 of March 11, 1953. The judge may refer an incidental question to the Constitutional Court if it is relevant to the proceedings and not manifestly unfounded; the referral order suspends the proceedings. It is not sufficient for the defence to raise the objection.


10. The hypothesized request would be an additive ruling in procedural matters. For the different issue of reopening a case after a violation of due process established by the ECHR, see Constitutional Court, judgment no. 113 of 2011 (ECLI:IT:COST:2011:113): an additive intervention is conceivable, but the facts and the constitutional basis do not coincide with those of the case at hand.


11. Article 425, paragraph 3, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended by Legislative Decree No. 150 of October 10, 2022. The criterion is the reasonable expectation of conviction, not the definitive determination of guilt, which is reserved for judgment and subject to the rule of beyond reasonable doubt.


12. Article 630, paragraph 1, letter c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CPP) on new evidence; letter a) on conflicts between final judgments. The application for review requires the admissibility assessment provided for by the Code. Article 635 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the suspension of the execution of the sentence in the review proceedings: it does not in itself suspend the proceedings against a different individual.

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